Before the US-USSR Cold War, There Was The Great Game

Long before the Soviet Union engaged the United States in its infamous Cold War, Imperial Russia engaged in another Cold War with a neighboring empire - Great Britain.

The 19th century’s Cold War, also coined by Rudyard Kipling as ‘The Great Game,’ featured two powerful empires seeking influence and limiting the other’s control over territories in Afghanistan and Central Asia. And while the beginning of the 19th century saw these two empire’s forces separated by more than 2,000 miles, by century’s end, the political jockeying would leave the two separated by a mere 30 miles. 

Throughout Russia’s history, there has been a desire to expand their reach geographically. For a country that spans 11 time zones, it is lacking certain key features that help sustain an empire’s power. It should come as no surprise that Imperial Russia long coveted a ‘warm’ sea port as well as increased influence in Central Asia. 

Just as there has always been a Russian desire to expand its boundaries and geographical influence, there have been watchful European eyes to the west, carefully monitoring and striving to keep a buffer between the westernized European countries and Russian reach. This was as true then as it is now.

In the 1830s, Britain became unnerved at the potential of Persia and the Ottoman Empire becoming Russian protectorates. As the Eastern Bloc states today provide a buffer between Russian and Europe, so to then did the British envision a series of buffer states between their empire and the Russian empire. It also sought to create a new trade route to the emirate of Bukhara. In establishing this route, the British had hoped it would gain dominance over Afghanistan, whilst also relying on the Khanate of Khiva, Persia, and Turkey.

In accomplishing this, not only would Britain successfully establish a line of protectorate states (again think similarly to the Eastern Bloc today), but it would also protect major sea trade routes and prevent Russia from obtaining its long desired port on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Persia. 

Recently, Imperial Russia had expanded its empire all the way to the Pacific. Though Europe was not immediately concerned with the empire heading east, as it did not impact any of their direct trade routes, it wouldn’t take long for British angst to rise as Russia pressed south from Siberia. In search of those ever elusive secure boundaries and a Eurasian Heartland sea port, Imperial Russia, coveted more Central Asian territory.

As the saying goes, suspicion begat suspicion, and while many historians believe that each respective party drastically miscalculated and falsely inflated the intentions of the other. This dance would lead both empires to gobble up various tribes and nations throughout Central Asia, and would come to a head in Afghanistan.

Britain’s aim for control of Afghanistan would result in four unsuccessful wars - the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1938, the Second Anglo-Sikh War in 1843, the Second Anglo-Sikh War in 1848, and the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878.

The fighting, tension and political jockeying would result in Great Britain losing control over several Khanates, including Bhakara - the very place it set out to establish influence in 1830. 

And though the British and Russians would enter into smaller agreements in the late 1800s, it wouldn’t be until the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 that the longstanding rivalry over Central Asia would formally end.

A line separating Persia into north and south regions was drawn. Britain promised to stay out of northern Persia, and in kind, Russia acknowledged southern Persia as a part of Britain’s influential sphere. This would include Tibet and Afghanistan. All told, the Convention identified controllers of the sought after regions of Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, and led to the formation of the Triple Entente. Though not a ‘true’ alliance, the significance of the Triple Entente would arise just a decade later.

The easing of tensions between Great Britain and Russia, and the flexibility of Triple Entente that the Anglo-Russian Convention generated established key members of the soon to be known Allied Powers. For the unified German state under Otto von Bismarck had been expanding its industrial and socio-political standing in the world. Bismarck had long sought to increase his nation’s influence and reach globally.

The Berlin-Baghdad railway was a means for the Germans to achieve their goal, and the 1,000 mile railway through the Middle East aimed to connect Germany to the Persian Gulf would enable Germany to compete with British trade in the region. 

Concerns from the Triple Entente around the implications of a German connection to the Persian Gulf grew. For example, the Germans had chosen to build parts of the railway outside of reach of British naval guns, although that meant crossing the costly Amanus Mountains. However, it wouldn’t be long before everyone’s attention shifted to Sarajevo and the July Crisis. World War I would follow, which as an aside, would stall the progress of the railroad as it would not be completed until 1940. 

Though many historians today posit German’s railroad ambitions did not directly lead to World War I, one has to wonder what implications historically it could have had had Great Britain and Russia not reached an agreement over their century-long dispute for influence of Central Asia and had their agreement not resulted in the formation of the Triple Entente.

For though the Triple Entente was not a formal alliance, it created a general policy between two powers - and a framework for the soon to be formed Triple Alliance. The seeds of which were planted after a century-long dispute over Central Asia.